Served in the Krogan uprisings. Now I run a podcast
Connect it to your PC or laptop and do a netinstall. Configure SSHD and a static ip. Plugin the disk to your server and then connect via ssh to admin it.
You could also set your laptop or PC to boot from the attached disk in the bios to test the services you want to start are starting
Happy to help 😉
Syncthing can do direct sync if you give the ip address to each node and you can disable relay servers .
Kdeconnect works great too if you are using linux and android
Yeah this is a much better approach
You could just poll it every few minutes via a cronjob and only send a notification if the numbers have increased.
Personally I use miniflux too in docker but I dont have a need for notifications.
Could you just poll the miniflux db directly ?
On laptops yes, on my server no. Most of the data is photo backups and linux ISOs form over the years.
I’m curious to know about the distro maintainers that were running bleeding edge with this exploit present. How do we know the bad actors didn’t compromise their systems in the interim ?
The potential of this would have been catastrophic had it made its way into the stable versions, they could have for example accessed the build server for tor or tails or signal and targeted the build processes . not to mention banks and governments and who knows what else… Scary.
I’m hoping things change and we start looking at improving processes in the whole chain. I’d be interested to see discussions in this area.
I think the fact they targeted this package means that other similar packages will be attacked. A good first step would be identifying those packages used by many projects and with one or very few devs even more so if it has root access. More Devs means chances of scrutiny so they would likely go for packages with one or few devs to improve the odds of success.
I also think there needs to be an audit of every package shipped in the distros. A huge undertaking , perhaps it can be crowdsourced and the big companies FAAGMN etc should heavily step up here and set up a fund for audits .
What do you think could be done to mitigate or prevent this in future ?
I doubt it, they need to leave the scene as part of the deal. Could they come along and do something anonymously , sure but I doubt its worth the risk to them.
And its gone
The devs had years of experience with 2 very successful emulators . Any new project would require some serious knowledge of the switch and low level programming in a variety of domains. There are a handful of people able to do that. Im guessing they were all either working on yuzu or ryujinx. The yuzu team is no longer allowed to work on emulation so that just leaves ryujinx who are already working on their own.
I want the forks to succeed but its not your standard program we are talking about. Then we have the fact that any successor would have an immediate target on them. Thats a tall ask for anyone.
Btop and logwatch with logrotate. I use healthchecks to check if the server is unreachable and it notifies me.
My block list is very small actually due to the non standard ssh port. Everything else goes through wireguard.
If it was open to the public then yes I’d have to reconsider the ban length.
You could not connect the TV and printer to the network but instead attach them to raspberry Pi or similar devices. This allows you full control and stops them calling home and spying.
Hackerman
Please see my reply below with links.
Onion repositories are package repositories hosted on tor hidden services. The connection goes through six hops and is end to end encrypted. In addition to further legitimizing the tor network with normal everyday usage it has the benefit of hiding what packages have been installed on a system.
Here are some notes about them if you want to read more.
https://blog.torproject.org/debian-and-tor-services-available-onion-services/
Well I dont trust closed source software and do what I can to avoid it when I can. At least foss can be audited. Also all the linux devices on the main network are devices I admin.
R.I.P