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Joined 3 years ago
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Cake day: June 10th, 2023

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  • Plex server doesn’t need to be “portable”

    Strongly disagree, I’ve switched my media server several times in the past decade for a multitude of reasons, having things in docker has allowed me to do this seamlessly.

    Also you’re ignoring all of the other benefits of running in docker, from isolation to automation.

    and running it in docker definitely doesn’t make it easier.

    Plex is the only self-hosted service that is purposefully trying to block you from being ran in docker. All other things are just much easier to run in docker, that’s part of the appeal, reproducible builds eliminate the “it works on my machine” errors.

    There absolutely are programs that make sense to run in docker, but Plex server isn’t one of them.

    Why do you think it doesn’t make sense? Does Jellyfin make sense to you to run in docker? Why are they different?

    Also, Plex only supports Ubuntu and CentOS, none of which I run on my server, so the only OFFICIAL way to run Plex is Docker.



  • What Plex does is closer to having an embedded tailscale client, you can access Jellyfin remotely with tailscale for free, but OP specifically asked for no VPN.

    That being said, I’m not opposed to Plex charging for that service, even a tailscale like server costs something to maintain. My gripe with Plex is that it purposefully shoots itself in the foot to force you into their paid service, i.e. it actively tries to isolate itself so you can’t access it remotely, which means that it can’t run inside a docker container unless you give it network host access, otherwise it only considers other docker containers locals and doesn’t let you watch your own content from another machine in the same network.





  • Except most people have almost the same structure because of media organizers like radarr/sonarr. At the very least they should hide that behind a setting to not require auth (since the header should be there for most clients) so only people running an old client would be affected. They could also add an extra salt to that hash or something similar.

    I agree, it’s not critical, but it shouldn’t be hand waved either. And like I said, security is relative, I would argue for most people this is fine, but I still think this should be taken more seriously.










  • I don’t get how that output showcases anything, unless he had run that against a known instance of forgejo so the owners of that instance could confirm that he actually executed code. But he’s only showing a text file, that’s like saying look I hacked super_secure_self_hosted_service:

    python hack_it.py localhost:3000
    
    Hacked!
    

    For all we know chain_alpha.py is just a bunch of prints.

    Also, even if it is real (which I don’t really doubt, but I have seen no proof) holding the information instead of properly disclosing it is just childish. It’s not a carrot methodology, it’s a stick one, and one without a carrot. This is the sort of thing you do to big companies with no morals, doing it to a small open source project is just wrong, they don’t have the manpower or money to redo the investigation you already did. Release a CVE, talk to the devs, and/or push a PR, but saying “I found a vulnerability but I won’t tell you about it” is just dumb.


  • That article has lots of issues:

    17% of the most popular Rust packages contain code that virtually nobody knows what it does

    That’s not true at all, the article where he got that information from says:

    Only 8 crate versions straight up don’t match their upstream repositories. None of these were malicious: seven were updates from vendored upstreams (such as wrapped C libraries) that weren’t represented in their repository at the point the crate version was published, and the last was the inadvertent inclusion of .github files that hadn’t yet been pushed to the GitHub repository.

    So, of the 999 most popular crates analyzed 0% contains code nobody knows what it does.

    He then lists some ways packages can be maliciously compromised:

    1. Steal credentials and impersonate a dev
    2. Misleading package names
    3. Malicious macros (this one is interesting, had never considered it before)
    4. Malicious build script

    And his solutions are:

    1. Bigger std library (solves none of the above)
    2. Source dependencies (solves none of the issues he showed, only the issue that happens in 0% of packages where binary doesn’t match the source and is detectable)
    3. Decentralized packages (which worsens every security concern)
    4. Centralized Checksum database (so a centralized package manager is bad, but a centralized Checksum index is good? How does that work?)

    Honestly I can’t take that article seriously, it grossly misinterpreted another study, presents problems that exist on every single package manager ever, doesn’t propose ANY valid solution, and the only thing he points to as a solution suffers from ALL of the same issues and then some.



  • Hey, I’ve been using silverbullet for a year or so. The first thing that I will say is that if you don’t care for client/server I would suggest just keep markdown files in a folder, that’s very portable and there are tons of plugins for editors to track that, that’s what I was doing before Silverbullet, and way before that it was org-mode which I still miss a few features sometimes. I’ve never used LogSeq, for any extended period so can’t talk about specifics there.

    From my experience these are the things I like about Silverbullet:

    • It’s mostly markdown, this means that if I ever have an issue with SB I can just access the files directly
    • Client/Server means I can add quick things from my phone/tablet/different computer very easily
    • Sync mode means I can edit even when offline and have it sync later
    • It is extremely hackable, if you can program you can make it do what you want and it can be amazing at times

    And these are some things I dislike about it:

    • Syntax doesn’t seem to be stable. I have some old files that don’t draw tables anymore because something changed in the extra syntax they have for queries.
    • It is very bare-bones, it doesn’t have the bells and whistles of other larger products and it never will, it’s not what it’s about.

    At the end of the day I think it’s a great tool for what it does, but you should understand what it is. If you’re expecting charts, diagrams or similar you will be sorely disappointed. If you expect a solid note taking app I think you’ll be very happy with it.


  • I theoretically have Diun setup, but realistically I just run my Ansible playbook weekly and have most containers set to latest. The exceptions being things that sometimes need special steps when upgrading such as Immich or critical stuff I want special attention such as Athelia/Authentik, for those I subscribe to their releases via RSS so I can update them easily, which usually is just changing a value in my Ansible configuration, but if extra changes are needed I can adapt them.