I’m curious as to why someone would need to do that short of having a bunch of users and a small office at home. Or maybe managing the family’s computers is easier that way?

I was considering a domain controller (biased towards linux since most servers/VMs are linux) but right now, for the homelab, it just seems like a shiny new toy to play with rather than something that can make life easier/more secure. There’s also the problem of HA and being locked out of your computer if the DC is down.

Tell me why you’re running it and the setup you’ve got that makes having a DC worth it.

Thanks!

  • MigratingtoLemmy@lemmy.worldOPEnglish
    2·
    9 months ago

    Thanks for the great answer.

    Using AD for SSO in git-frontends and other applications is a fantastic idea. I will probably also run FreeIPA (that’s a name I hadn’t heard in a while till this thread, from another commenter) and have a trust relationship.

    You’re right, this is probably better for learning rather than actually using at home, since most of my computers are linux/BSD, so if I needed a central auth server, I’d probably be better off using something made for *nix.

    With that said, I had a curious idea - can I spin up temporary credentials, using something akin to service/machine accounts, rotate credentials and invalidate credentials freely etc? In essence, I’m wondering if this can be a way to implement a sort of homegrown “AWS STS” alternative, for app secrets, workers and the like. I was initially looking at secret management suites like Vault and Conjur but what if this can do it?

    Also, can AD encrypt the DB? Can FreeIPA do it? I’d like such an option for security.

    Thanks!

    • computergeek125@lemmy.worldEnglish
      2·
      10 months ago

      I don’t have an immediate answer for you on encryption. I know most of the communication is encrypted in flight for AD, and on disk passwords are stored hashed unless the “use reversible encryption field is checked”. There are (in Microsoft terms) gMSAs (group-managed service accounts) but other than using one for ADFS (their oath provider), I have little knowledge of how it actually works on the inside.

      AD also provides encryption key backup services for Bitlocker (MS full-partition encryption for NTFS) and the local account manager I mentioned, LAPS. Recovering those keys requires either a global admin account or specific permission delegation. On disk, I know MS has an encryption provider that works with the TPM, but I don’t have any data about whether that system is used (or where the decryptor is located) for these accounts types with recoverable credentials.

      I did read a story recently about a cyber security firm working with an org who had gotten their way all the way down to domain admin, but needed a biometric unlocked Bitwarden to pop the final backup server to “own” the org. They indicated that there was native windows encryption going on, and managed to break in using a now-patched vulnerability in Bitwarden to recover a decryption key achievable by resetting the domain admin’s password and doing some windows magic. On my DC at home, all I know is it doesn’t need my password to reboot so there’s credentials recovery somewhere.

      Directly to your question about short term use passwords: I’m not sure there’s a way to do it out of the box in MS AD without getting into some overcomplicated process. Accounts themselves can have per-OU password expiration policies that are nanosecond accurate (I know because I once accidentally set a password policy to 365 nanoseconds instead of a year), and you can even set whole account expiry (which would prevent the user from unlocking their expired password with a changed one). Theoretically, you could design/find a system that interacts with your domain to set, impound/encrypt, and manage the account and password expiration of a given set of users, but that would likely be add on software.